b. Second Opinion, which is from Henry of Ghent

α. Exposition of the Opinion

207. Others [Henry of Ghent], conceding this conclusion [n.197] for which the authorities have been adduced [nn.198-206], say that the four reasons adduced for the negative conclusion [sc. the negative conclusion that there are not several substantial forms in Christ, nn.181-186] are valid about anything that is produced by one and the same agent, but are not valid about man, because man is produced by two agents and two changes: for the body is produced by the propagator, but the soul by the creator (Aristotle Generation of Animals 2.4.736b27-28, says “Only the intellect is from outside”).

208. And proofs are given for these two conclusions, namely for the first conclusion that these reasons are valid there, and for the second conclusion that they are not valid here.

209. [Proof of the first conclusion] - The first conclusion is proved as follows: “Everything that is, for this reason is, that it is one in number,” according to Boethius [in fact Dominicus Gundissalinus, On Unity]; therefore, for any single natural thing there is one change in number; but a change is distinguished in genus, species, and number by the form that is its term, Physics 5.4.227b3-24; therefore, of one change by which one natural thing is produced there is one form in number that is its term.

210. If it be said that in the generation of one natural thing there are many particular generations, and that these changes are to diverse forms as to their proper terms, - on the contrary: these several forms are drawn out from one potency of matter or from diverse ones.

211. Not from one potency because, according to the Commentator Metaphysics 12 com.11, “the number of potencies in matter follows the number of species;” and so these two forms, by which it would be one potency, would be of the same species; but it is impossible for two such forms to be together in the same thing. And further, then these forms would perfect matter as to the same potency, and then there would be two acts of the same potency, which seems contrary to the Philosopher Physics 3.1.201a19-21, a35-b.2, where he maintains that potencies are distinguished as the acts are, because if ‘able to be healthy’ and ‘able to be ill’ were the same, ‘being ill’ and ‘being healthy’ would be the same.

212. Nor can it be said that these forms are drawn out of diverse potencies of matter, because since the potencies would be in the matter without order, it would follow that the forms that perfect the matter would be without order, which is impossible. Then too it would follow that matter, as it is the term ‘from which’ of a generation that includes many changes, would be a being per accidens as having many potencies; but from a being per accidens only a being per accidens is generated; therefore the thing generated would only be per accidens one.

213. Again, all these reasons validly proceed from the per se idea of substantial form; for substantial form per se constitutes a being in act simply.

214. And if a reply is made in terms of ‘complete and incomplete’ - this is refuted because there would be no way to distinguish substantial form from accidental form. For however much a form might be of this sort or of that, one could escape the fact by saying that the substantial one was accidental, and conversely, by way of the complete and incomplete. And from this the following reasoning can be formed: that position is irrational which removes the distinction between substance and accident; but this reasoning is of this sort, because one cannot use it to conclude that some form is accidental by the fact that it is added to a being in act, for according to you the being it was added to was in incomplete act; and so may I say that if an accidental form be added, what was pre-existent to it was in incomplete act.The argument seems to be that, if one supposes there could be many substantial forms on the ground that a prior substantial form would be incomplete and would be completed by a later and more complete substantial form, then one has abolished the distinction between substance and accident. For an accident is said to be an accident because it comes to or is added to what already exists as a substance. But if a previous incomplete substantial form is completed by another more complete substantial form that comes to or is added to it, then there is no difference between a substantial form that comes to or is added to an (incomplete) substance and an accidental form that comes to or is added to an (incomplete) substance. But to abolish the distinction between substantial and accidental forms is irrational. ²⁶

215. [Proof of the second conclusion] - The second conclusion, namely that the arguments [nn.182-186] are not valid in the case of man [nn.207-208], but that the opposite is true there, is proved as follows: Every per se agent has per se some act that is the proper term of its action, and consequently where there are diverse agents and diverse actions the same form cannot be the per se term (this is confirmed by the Philosopher in Physics 5.4.228a6-19, where he maintains that the same health, because of the diversity of actions, cannot go back to this and that heath). But the uncreated agent acts per se for the generation of man, because he infuses the intellective soul, and the created agent acts per se for the generation of man by altering, corrupting, and changing, otherwise an ox would no more be father of an ox than an ass would be, save because by the action of an ox from the seed of the ox an ox were generated; and so it is in man.

216. And the argument is confirmed because, if the same thing be the per se term of each agent, either the same composite or the same form. If the first, the composite, be granted then a man is created, because he is the per se term of creation; if the form, then the form is per se from the propagator because it is the per se term of the action; and both are unacceptable [sc. because the composite that is man is not created but propagated, and because the form or the intellective soul of man is not propagated but created].

217. [Four things added to the proofs of the first conclusion] - And Henry adds, in conformity with his first reason [nn.209-214], that for two forms drawn out of the potency of matter there are distinct powers; but for two forms one of which is drawn out from the potency of matter and the other created there are not two abilities or powers; and so there is more a single generation for two forms in the second way than in the first.

218. He also adds that the form that can give being to matter really, in separation from a second form, is of a nature to constitute a supposit, and so every form that comes to it in addition is an accident; but a form that is not of a nature to give per se being without another form is not of a nature to constitute a supposit save miraculously. And, as to the issue at hand, the form of the mixture is not a form of a nature to perfect the whole save while the intellective soul is perfecting it, and so it is of a nature to be separated from the matter when the soul ceases to form it. And therefore it is a miracle that the form of the mixture remains in the matter without the intellective soul; nor is the intellective soul that comes to the mixture an accident, because the first is not of a nature to constitute a supposit save miraculously.

219. He adds too that the same matter is what can properly be perfected by the mixture and the intellective soul, but the prior form, that of the mixture, does not constitute what is properly receptive of the soul, for then the intellective soul would come to a being in act and would then not be a substantial form

220. He adds, fourth, that the intellective soul contains in itself the vegetative and sensitive soul; and the form of the mixture contains virtually all the other forms that can exist separately in other forms of body. And therefore the intellective soul does not contain the form of the mixture, because it is unmixed and without extension and without ability to be extended, and therefore it contains the forms that are able to have being in such a way. But the form of the mixture contains all the forms that are extended and able to be extended. And therefore these two [intellective soul and form of the mixture] are sufficient in man’s case.

β. Rejection of the Opinion

221. Argument against the conclusion [n.207] is drawn from the fourth and last addition [n.220] as follows: The vegetative soul in a plant contains in itself the form of corporeity, and the sensitive soul in an ox contains the vegetative soul and corporeity, otherwise one would have to posit several forms in them, which Henry denies [nn.209-214]. I then take this proposition, ‘whatever perfectly and formally contains some form that formally contains another form, also contains that other form’; but the intellective soul perfectly and formally contains the vegetative and sensitive soul, according to you [n.220], and this not under an idea that destroys the idea of the vegetative and sensitive soul but under a more perfect idea than those forms would have without the intellective soul; therefore the intellective soul perfectly contains the form [sc. corporeity] that the vegetative and sensitive soul contain.

222. So it seems without reason to say that the sensitive soul in a brute and the vegetative soul in a plan contain the form of corporeity and yet that the vegetative and sensitive soul, as contained in the intellective soul, and in a more perfect way, do not contain the same form.

223. If you say that they are contained in the intellective soul in a non-extended way and do not contain the form of corporeity, which is capable of extension - on the contrary: either the way not capable of extension or the way capable of extension or neither is repugnant to the sensitive and vegetative soul. If in the first way then they are not in the intellective soul. If in the second way then they do not contain the form of corporeity. But if the third member is granted, namely neither this way nor that, then the sensitive and vegetative soul will be able to contain the form of corporeity indifferently as they are in themselves or as they are contained in the intellective soul. For then they contain corporeity because of the order of perfection of form to form, and not because they have such and such a mode of existence; but the order of perfection is always the same.

224. Again, it seems more manifest (setting the faith aside) one can conclude that the form of the mixture differs from the soul in other living things than from the intellective soul in man.

225. The proof is that the same effect cannot regularly come from agents of just any sort and however diverse; but by whatever and in whatever way a living body is corrupted, provided however it be not immediately reduced to its elements, the same corpse and a corpse of the same idea is always produced (as is plain to the senses). But the same thing cannot be the proper term of this action and of that agent; so no new thing is produced by the corrupting action of the animated thing, but it is something left behind.

226. This is plain in a particular case: if an ox is destroyed by a knife or by drowning or killing or in other ways, always the same cadaver of the same idea is left behind; but these and those corrupting agents are not of a nature to introduce the same but rather different forms, and this at once without any previous alteration. Rather, if the same form had to be produced and by the same agent, a uniform alteration would yet seem to be a necessary prerequisite; but here, however different in form the alteration that precedes and however much from different agents, the same term always follows.

227. Against the second addition, namely about a form that naturally perfects seperately from another form [n.218], the argument is as follows: every agent that has sufficient power for its own action without the action of something else, and sufficient power for the term of the action, is able to form the passive subject into that form without the action of something else; but a natural agent has power for its action and for the term of its action, which is the form of the mixture, using its ordinary influence without special divine action. For the fact that God then creates the soul in the same instant is not something naturally prior to the propagator’s introducing of the form of the mixture; rather it is naturally posterior, just as the form for which it is the disposition follows the disposition. Nor does God create the soul simply necessarily, but he does so merely contingently; therefore that agent [sc. the propagator] can form the passive subject in the form of the mixture without divine action; and consequently there is no repugnance nor contradiction (with respect even to a created agent) in the form of the mixture doing the forming without the intellective soul. Therefore there is no miracle [n.218].

228. Against the third addition, about what in the intellective soul is properly capable of perfection, there are two arguments [n.219]:

First as follows: what is properly perfectible can be made perfect with its proper perfection by a sufficient agent when any other agent and any other perfection are removed (especially an agent that does not depend in its acting on the action of that other agent). Therefore, if prime matter is what is first and properly perfected by the intellective soul, then by the agency of God (who does not depend in his acting on anything created) the matter can be formed with the intellective soul without the action of a created agent and without the term of that action; and so the intellective soul can immediately, without any form of mixture, perfect prime matter. This seems unacceptable, because such a composite does not seem to be a man, since it would not have what belongs to the being of man; nor would it not be a man, because it would have that by which a man is formally a man.

229. Second as follows: from two acts, one of which is not in potency with respect to the other, nothing per se one can come to be (this seems to be taken from Metaphysics 7.13.1039a3-8, 8.6.1054a14-25), because each of the acts there remains simply act with respect to the other, and nothing per se one comes to be from two acts that, in and between themselves, are act. But for you the form of the mixture and the intellective soul are two acts, and neither is potential with respect to the other, because neither is the idea of receiving the other; therefore nothing per se one comes to be from them.

230. If you say, that it is rather because the same thing (namely the matter) receives both, this is nothing against the minor of the argument [n.229 ‘for you the form of the mixture and the intellective soul are two acts’], because the per se unity of any being is from its act, not from its potency (from the above cited references [n.229]).

γ. To the Reasons for the Opinion

231. [To the reasons for the first conclusion] - Against the reasons for this opinion [nn.209-214] to the extent it agrees with the preceding opinion.

232. Against the way by division ‘either by one change or by many’ [n.209], I argue as follows: either two changes ordered to ordered forms are sufficient for the unity of a generated composite or only one change is required. If the latter is not sufficient, then there are several changes, though ordered ones, by certain agents, yet the generated thing will not be one, and then man - according to this opinion - will not be one. But if the former is sufficient then, although the several changes are from one agent, the thing produced will be no less able to be one than if the changes were from diverse agents. Indeed, other things being equal, it seems rather that one agent suffices than several.

233. The response is made to this that two changes, for which there is one potency of matter, suffice for the product’s being one, but not where there are diverse potencies of matter; but, according to the first addition [n.217], there are diverse powers for forms drawn out of the potency of matter, but for a form drawn out and another not drawn out there is the same power; and two agents have regard to this potency and to that, and therefore two changes from two such subordinate agents suffice for producing the composite, but the two other changes do not suffice.

234. On the contrary: either the potencies are numbered with the numbering of the form, and then it follows that there are two potencies on both sides just as there are two forms, whether they are drawn out by the same or by diverse agents. Or the potency is not numbered with respect to the form but with respect to the agent, and it follows that there is more a numbering of potency when the agents are diverse than when there is one agent only.

235. You will say: they are numbered according to the number absolutely of the forms received in the composite and that are drawn out from its potency, and such are those that are the term of the actions of a natural agent. But the form that is the term of the action of the creator is not such, and so they are not numbered according to this form.

236. On the contrary: it is an accident to matter that the form perfecting it is drawn out or not drawn out from its potency; for if it were possible for some form to exist in matter and yet not to be drawn from its potency, it would perfect the matter just as if it were drawn out from its potency; therefor the matter is disposed in the same way in idea of being perfectible to what is drawn out and to what is not drawn out, and consequently the potencies of matter will be numbered or will not be numbered in the same way in respect of this form and of that.

237. In accord with this one can make reply to the first reason for the second opinion [n.209]: for either member can be granted. And first indeed that there is one change by which one natural being is produced - and this when speaking of the final change. And then I concede that the conclusion is true that there is only one form that is the per se term of the change. However, there are several partial changes that have had several preceding forms as term: either in order of duration if one posits that one form is introduced earlier in time than another, or in order of nature if one posits that they are all introduced at the same time, unless (as was said in [Scotus’] Metaphysics IX q.14 nn.40-43) there was not properly a change for the final form.

238. An example of this is if organic parts differing in substantial form are posited; for then the generation of one part precedes the generation of another part not only in nature but also in time, and so also does the generation that is simply generation of the whole, namely by which the total form is produced with the forms of all the parts having been already presupposed.

239. But by thus positing one or many forms you would say: is there one potency or several in the matter with respect to these several ordered forms?

240. One could grant either this alternative or that:

And if one potency is granted, I respond to the two refutations of it [n.211]. To the first: ‘a potency one in species is related to a form one in species’ is true, when they are of the same order. And to the two authorities from the Philosopher Physics 3 [n.211] I reply that they are understood not of receptive potency and received act, but of potency and act as these are opposite differences of being, as is plain of ‘able to be healed’ and ‘being sick’ which he gives as examples. But this is not true of the potency of a subject, because the same body and the same receptive potency can be posited in a body with respect to two contraries, though the acts are not the same. But this distinction between act and potency in this way and that are plain from this question, in the first part [nn.126-132].

241. If it also be granted that there are two potencies with respect to this and that form, then a reply can easily be made to the two refutations of this member:

For when it is said first that ‘the two potencies are present in the matter without order’ [n.212], this can be denied; indeed there is in the matter an order to one of the forms more essentially and more immediately than to the other, just as a potency in a subject can, with respect to diverse properties, be prior with respect to one of them and posterior with respect to the other. But if it were conceded that the powers are equally balanced, it does not follow that the acts are; for there can be an order in the potencies as regard the terms although not an order in them as regard the foundation (as is plain in many other cases, where two respects without order are in one foundation and the terms of those respect have an order between themselves and in relation to the foundation).

242. The other proof about being per accidens [n.212] is not evident; for although air could be generated from fire, yet not for this reason does it follow that fire under the idea of ‘term from which’ is a being per accidens, because this potentiality and that do not per se constitute a ‘term from which’. So too on the part of the subject: it does not follow, if it have different potencies, that ‘if the powers are accidental to each other then what has them is a being per accidens’.

243. The second principal reason for this opinion [n.213], which proceeds from the idea of substantial form and from the unity of the thing, does not hold, since I distinguish ‘to give being simply’; for, in accordance with the Philosopher Generation and Corruption 1.3.317b1-3 (where he argues that nothing can come to be from a ‘nonbeing simply’), I reply to the argument by drawing a distinction within ‘non-being simply’:

Either as the ‘simply’ is taken universally, and then a ‘non-being simply’ is a pure nothing, and it is in this way that from a ‘non-being simply’ nothing can come to be; and the being opposite to this non-being is any being whatever, however minimal be the entitative reality that it have.

In another way ‘being simply’ is taken as it is distinguished from ‘being in a certain respect’; and then ‘being simply’ is substance and ‘being in a certain respect’ is accident; and it is plain what is the ‘non-being simply’ opposite to this.

244. So I say to the issue at hand that substantial form gives ‘being simply’; not indeed ‘first being’ (namely what immediately follows ‘non-being simply’), but the ‘being simply’ that is distinguished from ‘being in a certain respect’.

The first point is plain, because if an accident were to come first to matter, although it would give matter ‘first formal being’, yet it would give it not simply but in a certain respect, because it is not act simply but act in a certain respect. Also, there is no material substantial form that does not presuppose matter, and a matter that has ‘being simply’, that is ‘being’ departing from non-being (as was proved in this solution, the first part [nn.130-131]), because, according to the adversaries [Henry of Ghent], matter has ‘being simply’ in this way even without any form. Therefore, it is not just substantial form that gives ‘being simply’ nor does it give it first, that is universally, but it gives it when ‘being simply’ is taken in the second way[n.243], as it is opposed to ‘being in a certain respect’. I say therefore that, as being is divided into prior and posterior, or first and second, and the first contains substance under it and the posterior contains accident under it, so ‘simply’ in this way of understanding is equivalent to what is ‘naturally first’, and ‘in a certain respect’ is equivalent to what is ‘naturally posterior’ (and in this way every accident gives ‘being in a certain respect’).

245. I say, therefore, that substantial form, whether it comes to something either already possessing being or not, always gives ‘being simply’ in this second way but not in the first way - just as accidental form, whatever it comes to, gives being not ‘simply’ but ‘in a certain respect’.

246. And if you ask “how can it be proved that this from gives ‘being simply’ and that does not, if giving being as it departs immediately from non-being is of the idea of neither?” - I reply: are you asking about the thing in itself or in relation to our cognition? If in itself, there is no cause that this gives ‘being simply’ and that ‘being in a certain respect’ save that this is substantial form and that accidental form; for just as there is no cause that a hot thing heats, because the cause is immediate (and between an immediate cause and its effect there is no intermediate cause), so in the genus of formal cause this proposition is immediate ‘heat constitutes a hot thing and soul constitutes man’; and it is the immediacy of form to formal act.

247. And if you are asking about the thing in relation to our knowledge, which the argument [n.246] seems to be proceeding about, as if this opinion would destroy all distinction for us between substantial form and accidental form - I reply:

Philosophers have distinguished between substantial form and accidental form a posteriori through these middle terms: ‘to have a contrary and not to have a contrary’, ‘to receive more and less and not to receive them’, and ‘there can be motion in accord with it or there cannot be’. But to the issue itself I say briefly that there is one middle term through which, as concerns our knowledge, the distinction is more manifestly drawn between what form coming to a being in act is a substantial form and what form coming to a being in act is an accidental form. For as long as the process is made through substantial forms, a posterior is always more perfect than those that are prior; but when it comes to accidental forms a later form is more imperfect than the last preexisting one. But as to what form is more perfect than another, this cannot be made known to us save a posteriori. And this is reasonable both in itself and in us; in itself indeed because in a subject the same in genus no form comes to a form save as making it more perfect in that genus; but whatever comes to it in another genus, namely as an accident, is more imperfect (whatever is presupposed) than a substantial form.

The response then to the form of the argument is plain, that this opinion does not destroy the distinction between accidental form and substantial form, neither in itself (for this distinction is immediate, because this is this and that is that), nor as to our knowledge through those middle terms through which we are able to recognize this distinction. And no wonder if, when distinguishing this form from that, one must, according to our understanding, use things posterior to this form and to that, because neither do we in any other way recognize substantial forms in anything, as it were, save a posteriori.

248. [To the reason for the second conclusion] - The reason that he gives for the other member [n.215], namely that the four reasons are not valid about man, make for our position.

Yet insofar as he denies this conclusion about other living things, one can reply that in respect of any living thing one can posit that it has two agents, or as it were two. For any form of life is more excellent simply than any form of mixture, and so whatever introduces the form of life must be more perfect in itself, or in another, as it precisely introduces the form of the mixture. Therefore, although it is by the same agent that the mixed body and the soul are introduced in a plant or a brute, yet the ‘same’ there is as it were two agents, because the agent has in itself the idea of a more perfect and of a more imperfect agent.